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REAL PROPERTY-ADVERSE PossESSION-BEIWEEN CoTENANTs-C. V. James 
and his wife and children owned certain property as tenants in common. 
In 1931 defendant Fallon recovered a judgment against C. V. James, and 
the land was sold by a sheriff under execution. Fallon became the pur-
chaser at the sheriff's sale and was issued a sheriff's deed purporting to 
convey the entire interest in the property. Thereafter he was "in the 
actual, visible, distant, hostile, exclusive, continuous and uninterrupted 
possession" of the land and paid all taxes thereon. Plaintiffs, the wife 
and children of James, brought this action to determine the ownership of 
the property. Fallon claimed title by adverse possession under an eighteen-
year statute of limitations. The lower court held that the plaintiffs, 
as tenants in common, were the owners of a ¼ interest in the land 
and that defendant had claim only to the ¾ interest formerly owned 
by the judgment debtor. On appeal, held, affirmed. The sheriff's deed 
passed to defendant only such interest as was owned by the judgment 
debtor, making him a tenant in common with plaintiffs. The statute of 
limitations does not begin to run against cotenants until an "ouster" of 
the cotenants has been established, and under the facts presented Fallon 
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did nothing amounting to an "ouster." Fallon v. Davidson, (Colo. 1958) 
320 P. (2d) 976. 
Since each cotenant is entitled to possession of commonly owned 
property, as a general rule possession by one is, in law, possession by all.1 
As between cotenants, though the usual elements of adverse possession 
are present, this will ordinarily preclude the acquisition of title by ad-
verse possession unless and until there has been an "ouster" of the other 
cotenants.2 It is everywhere admitted that an actual "turning out by the 
heels" is not a necessary element of "ouster," but beyond this negative 
approach the courts have not framed an exact definition of the word. 
In cases involving title disputes between original cotenants, the courts 
require the cotenant in possession to give the cotenants out of possession 
notice of his intent to claim adversely.3 In cases where a third-party 
grantee in a deed from one of the original cotenants is in possession, 
courts generally make a distinction· on the basis of the wording of the 
deed under which he claims. Where the deed purports to convey only 
the cotenant grantor's interest, actual notice of the adverse claim must 
be given.4 When the deed purports to convey the entire interest in 
the land,5 however, the courts are predisposed to hold that the statute 
of limitations has run.6 Some courts completely do away with the notice 
requirement,7 while others retain it but infer such notice either from 
l See 4 TIFFANY, REAL PROPERTY, 3d ed., §1185 (1939); 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY 
§15.7 (1952). 
2 Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, (S.D. Fla. 1925) 3 F. (2d) 841_ at 844: 
"As I understand the law, this rule applies in all cases except where the possession of 
the cotenant is such as to amount to an ouster." See 21 Miss. L. J. 147 (1949). 
3 Most courts require actual notice to be given. See 10 TEX. L. REv. 336 (1932). Some 
courts have allowed a jury to infer notice from the sole and uninterrupted possession 
of the property continued for many years without interference or claim by the cotenants 
out of possession. Singer v. Naron, 99 Ark. 446, 138 S.W. 958 (1911). The notice require-
ment also prevails in cases where one of the original cotenants is claiming under a deed 
purporting to convey the entire interest in the property but which in fact does not 
convey the interests of cotenants out of possession. Rose v. Roso, 119 Colo. 473, 204 P. 
(2d) 1075 (1949). One case held, however, that the recording of such deed gave construc-
tive notice of the adverse claim and thereby started the statute of limitations running. 
Ames v. Howes, 13 Idaho 756, 93 P. 35 (1907). 
4 Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525 (1867); Keeler v. McNeir, 184 Okla. 244, 86 P. (2d) 1004 
(1939). 
5 Most courts have not distinguished between a quit claim deed and a warranty deed 
where both purport to convey the entire interest in the property. Lucas v. Crofoot, 95 
Conn. 619, 112 A. 165 (1921); Thurmond v. Espalin, 50 N.M. 109, 171 P. (2d) 325 (1946). 
A few have felt, however, that the very nature of a quit claim deed precludes it from 
purporting to convey more than the grantor had. Cook v. Rochford, (Fla. 1952) 60 S. 
(2d) 531; 32 A.L.R. (2d) 1210 (1953). 
6 See 32 A.L.R. (2d) 1214 (1953). 
7 Some courts have indicated that exclusive possession by a third party grantee 
claiming under a deed from an original cotenant amounts to "ouster" per se. Com-
modores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, note 2 supra; Whittington v. Cameron, 385 
m. 99, 52 N.E. (2d) 134 (1943); Smith v. Lemp, 31 Del. Ch. 1, 63 A. (2d) 169 (1949). 
See 150 A.L.R. 551 (1944). Other courts have treated such a grantee as a stranger rather 
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mere possession by- the new grantee8 or from the recording of the 
deed under which the grantee claims.9 This change in judicial atti-
tude has no doubt resulted from concern for the third-party cotenant 
who has occupied the land under a mistaken belief of sole ownership. 
A diligent search of the grantor's title, however, would result in a dis-
covery of the cotenancy; and by giving such a grantee cotenant special 
treatment, the courts are putting a premium on lack of good faith effort. 
Since the innocent cotenants out of possession should have a right to 
assume that the cotenant in possession is claiming only his interest in 
the cotenancy, the language of the deed under which the possessor claims 
should have no bearing on whether or not the statute of limitations has 
started to run. It would seem, therefore, that as between all cotenants 
notice of the adverse claim should be one of the necessary elements of 
adverse possession. Rather than require such notice in all situations, 
however, the court in the principal case preferred to draw a distinction 
between a case in which a grantee claims under a sheriff's deed and one in 
which a grantee claims undel' a deed voluntarily executed by a grantor 
cotenant. It was indicated that whereas the voluntary execution of a 
deed by a cotenant grantor purporting to convey the entire interest in 
property might well be held an "ouster," the requirement of notice 
prevails in cases where the grantee claims under a sheriff's deed. Thus, 
the creditor's rights in the conveyed land would depend on whether the 
debtor conveyed it voluntarily in payment of the debt, or whether he 
forced the creditor to obtain it at execution sale. The majority of courts 
have not made this distinction, but hold that a foreclosure proceeding, 
judgment, and deed purporting to convey the entire property, followed 
by actual- and exclusive possession by the purchaser starts the statute of 
limitations running.10 Since it is the grantee cotenant who is claiming title 
adversely, his acts, rather than those of the original cotenant in determin-
than a cotenant and have thus eliminated the ·"ouster" requirement entirely. Joyce v. 
Dyer, 189 Mass. 64, 75 N.E. 81 (1905); Elsheimer v. Parker Bank and Trust Co., 237 
Ala. 24, 185 S. 385 _(1938). 
s Gardner v. Hinton, 86 Miss. 604, 38 S. 779 (1905); Witherspoon v. Brummett, 50 
N.M. 303, 176 P. (2d) 187 (1946). Contra, Fordson Coal Co. v. Vanover, 291 Ky. 447, 164 
S.W. (2d) 966 (1942). 
9 May v. Chesapeake &: Ohio Ry. Co., 184 Ky. 493, 212 S.W. 131 (1919); Farmers 
State Bank v. Lanning, 162 Kan. 95, 174 P. (2d) 69 (1946); Parr v. Ratisseau, (Tex. Civ. 
App. 1951) 236 S.W. (2d) 503. Contra, West v. Evans, 29 Cal. (2d) 414, 175 P. (2d) 219 
(1946). 
10 Hopson v. Fowlkes, 92 Tenn. 697 (1893); Cox v. Tompkinson, 39 Wash. 70, 80 
P. 1005 (1905); Bradshaw v. Holmes, (Tex. Civ. App. 1951) 246 S.W. (2d) 296. Contra, 
Curtis v. Barber, 131 Iowa 400, 108 N.W. 755 (1906). See John L. Roper Lumber Co. v. 
Richmond Cedar Works, 165 N.C. 83, 80 S.E. 982 (1914), where it was held that a grantee 
claiming under a cotenant's deed purporting to convey the entire interest in land could 
acquire full title only after twenty years of adverse possession, while allowing a grantee 
claiming under a sheriff's deed describing the property in the same manner to acquire 
such title after only seven years of adverse possession. 
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ing through what procedure the creditor gets title, should be, and are 
in most courts, of primary importance in determining whether or not 
there was an "ouster." Policywise there appears to be no basis for dis-
tinguishing between a grantee claiming under a sheriff's deed and one 
claiming under a voluntary conveyance by a cotenant. While it is true 
that one claiming under the sheriff's deed should realize that he could 
acquire no greater interest than that of the judgment debtor,11 a grantee 
claiming under a deed executed by a cotenant should realize that he could 
acquire no greater interest than that of his grantor.12 Consequently, 
each should be required to "oust" his other cotenants, for in each case 
a diligent search of his chain of title would reveal the cotenancy. 
Paul K. Gaston 
11 Reagan v. Dick, 88 Colo. 122, 293 P. 333 (1930). 
12 Hardman v. Brown, 77 W.Va. 478, 88 S.E. 1016 (1916). 
